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Abstract. In the Internet of Things and smart environments data, col-
lected from distributed sensors, is typically stored and processed by a
central middleware. This allows applications to query the data they need
for providing further services. However, centralization of data causes sev-
eral privacy threats: The middleware becomes a third party which has to
be trusted, linkage and correlation of data from different context becomes
possible and data subject lose control over their data.
Hence, other approaches than centralized processing should be consid-
ered. Here, Secure Multiparty Computation is a promising candidate
for secure and privacy-preserving computation happening close to the
sources of the data.
In order to make SMC fit for application in these contexts, we extend
SMC to act as a service: We provide elements which allow third parties
to query computed data from a group of peers performing SMC. Further-
more, we establish fine-granular access control on the level of individual
data queries, yielding data protection of the computed results. By adding
measures to inform data sources about requests and the usage of their
data, we show how a fully privacy-preserving service can be built on the
foundation of SMC.
Keywords: Privacy · Transparency · Intervenability · Access control ·
Internet of Things · Secure Multiparty Computation.
1 Introduction
In the last years, the Internet of Things (IoT) has become an emerging trend,
including the rise of smart environments. In these contexts, a certain structure
of applications is prevalent: Data points are collected at different (spatial or
logical) locations; for their utilization, they are horizontally aggregated over a
set of collectors; the outcomes are statistics or higher-level information which are
then used by other services. The corresponding architecture normally features
sensors for data collection, a middleware for data storage and processing and
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services which receive the processed data for further usage. Examples for services
are public displays providing statistics and controllers or actuators triggered by
data change events.
However, the data which is initially collected by sensors is privacy-sensitive
since it typically reflects user presence and interaction: Presence influences the
temperature in single rooms, the CO2 concentration and device utilization (e.g.
lighting). Certain sensors, e.g. for power consumption tracking provide even more
specific insights into user behavior (Intrusive Load Monitoring, cf. [26]). This
raises a huge need for information security and privacy, which is not well ad-
dressed by centralized storage and processing solutions.
Secure Multiparty Computation is an emerging and highly promising ap-
proach for providing privacy-preserving systems. It encompasses a class of pro-
tocols which allows a group of parties to compute arbitrary functions based on
confidential inputs without sharing these values with any other party. With the
advent of edge computing [32][30] it also becomes a promising alternative in the
context of smart environments: Data can remain on local sensor platforms in the
proximity of the sensors where it was collected. Execution of SMC protocols be-
tween these nodes then enables secure processing without sharing or centralizing
raw sensor data.
However, SMC is not directly applicable in the depicted context due to an
architectural mismatch: SMC uses a peer-to-peer like communication (cf. [7,15])
while smart environments are service-oriented: Nodes provide services for other
clients; in particular, clients should be able to request specific data processing
and receive the result afterwards. Our goal in this paper is to extend SMC to
be applicable in the architecture of smart environments. Using a state of the art
notion of privacy, we yield a fully privacy-preserving service for the processing
of sensor data.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we provide
our notion of privacy and a background on SMC. In Section 3, we elaborate the
related work on practical application of SMC. Section 4 provides a goal statement
of our work. We present our approach in Section 5 while Section 6 discusses the
achievements afterwards. A performance evaluation of our approach is carried
out in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Background
In this section, we provide the background to our notion of privacy, SMC in
general and the Security and Privacy Model of SMC applied to our domain of
smart environments.
2.1 Privacy
Initially, privacy and data protection are high-level concepts. In order to realize
these properties in an information technological system, it is necessary to further
refine them and break them down into more specific parts.
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Like security years before, privacy and data protection recently underwent
the process of refinement by defining protection goals, which make the concepts
more graspable. Following [29,25,19,28], these protection goals mainly are data
minimization, unlinkability, transparency and intervenability. For the standard
definition we refer to the mentioned literature, especially [29]. An interpretation
in our specific context is provided in Section 2.3.
We utilize this notion of privacy and data protection, since it is state of
the art and has found widespread adaptation, be it on the level of individual
states [1,33] or the European Union [17].
2.2 Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)
SMC formalizes a problem of controlled leakage. Assume multiple cooperating
parties, each holding a confidential value. They agree on some function which
takes these values as inputs. Using SMC, the function is correctly evaluated
while its result is the only new information released. The input of each peer is
not shared with any third party including the other cooperating peers. [13]
The seminal work of Yao [34,35] laid the foundation of SMC; from there, sev-
eral different methods for realization emerged (e.g., [7,12,18]). The most promis-
ing foundations for SMC currently are garbled circuits, homomorphic encryption
and secret sharing schemes. These approaches enable different usage models [6],
i.e., outsourced processing, outsourced services and joint processing. For a com-
prehensive overview see [6]. Today, research mainly focuses on the performance
of general purpose computation suites, strengthening their security, identify-
ing new fields of application and designing efficient specific purpose protocols.
[15,14,20,21]
With regard to privacy protection, SMC naturally fulfills data minimiza-
tion and unlinkability. Data minimization is provided since raw data can remain
where it is created. Desired results can be computed by SMC directly without
creating privacy-critical intermediary data. Two types of unlinkability are given:
By aggregation of multiple parties’ input data, linkability between the individ-
ual input data and the result is prevented. Tracing back unique parties’ inputs
from a result is impossible in the general case. Furthermore, linkability among
different parties, i.e., correlation of their data, is prevented, since this data is
never available at the same logical location.
Currently, a small amount of actively developed SMC frameworks [2,4,5]
exists. These provide an implementation of the basic operations and enable cre-
ation of arbitrary composed algorithms. Their application is initially restricted
to the distributed execution of the created protocols, which does not encom-
pass management and orchestration of peers, coordination of computations and
infrastructural requirements enabling application of SMC in data processing sce-
narios.
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2.3 Security and Privacy Model
Assets The main asset to be protected is the individual raw data of sensor
platforms. We assume them to be owned each by the respective data subject,
i.e., the person(s) about which the platform gathers information. This is given
in use cases where a single smart building is inhabited by different parties, e.g.,
smart hotels, smart houses with individual rental apartments and can also be
given in smart office buildings, if employees have dedicated offices. The necessity
for data protection is based on the possibility that sensor data gives insights
about the presence and behavior of individuals [27].
Protection Goals With respect to the mentioned assets we understand secu-
rity to be confidentiality of this very raw data. However, confidentiality may not
hinder all processing of the data. Instead, a privacy-preserving access must be de-
signed, meaning data access which is controllable by and accountable for the data
owners. Following our privacy background in Section 2.1, privacy-preservation
encompasses the protection goals of 1) data minimization, 2) unlinkability,
3) transparency, and 4) intervenability. They have the following meaning in
our context: 1) Information is only derived from raw data if it is actually needed
by any client service. The purpose is known before information is created. 2) In-
formation made available to clients does not allow restoring contributions of indi-
vidual single peers. Correlations between individual peers should not be possible
by client accessible data. 3) Peers should know, what information is derived
from their data and for which purpose this information is used. 4) Based on
this preliminary knowledge, they should remain in control of their data by de-
ciding which computations may be carried out.
Attacks In classical architectures previously mentioned protection goals are not
or only partially fulfilled. Central storage creates a high value target and a single
point of attack. Furthermore, it allows arbitrary processing, using data for other
purposes and correlation of available data; all this being completely intransparent
for individuals and without any ability to intervene.
In our architecture, these attacks are mitigated, since raw data stays on
the peers, clients only obtain the post-processed information they have been
granted access beforehand. That information is generated by SMC in a privacy-
preserving manner and the gateway only orchestrates data processing while not
having access to raw data.
Introducing these three roles, further attacks have to be considered: Malicious
peers can try to obtain information from other peers (A.1) or provide wrong
results (A.2). A malicious gateway can try to obtain information on their own
behalf (A.3), collect (A.4) or tamper with results (A.5) obtained from peers
before forwarding. Malicious clients can try to obtain information without having
the appropriate access right (A.6) or correlate (A.7) information they were able
to obtain.
In our considerations, we exclude A.1 since it has to be addressed on the level
of the SMC protocols and A.2 since the correctness of input values provided by
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peers is out of scope of realizing secure computation (cf. [13, p. 11]). Furthermore,
A.7 is excluded since it depends on the exact choice of available computation
queries. While designing our approach to enable SMC usage, we consider the
remaining abovementioned attacks A.3–A.6.
Trust An ultimate design goal is to reduce the amount of components which
have to be trusted to handle private raw data faithfully. Our architecture has
been designed to avoid single points of attack and high value targets holding
private raw data from several parties. The remaining trust is diversified: We
associate each sensor platform with individual users. These users trust their
respective platform to faithfully collect and store their data. This assumption
does not strongly differ from assumptions in classical architectures: In any case,
by generating it, sensors have access to privacy-critical data. Furthermore, all
trust requirements for the used SMC protocol realization apply.
3 Related Work
Several results were achieved in the last years. However, they show mere feasi-
bility without aiming for an automated system providing SMC as a service. In
[9] SMC was used to perform an auction between buyers and sellers of a specific
product. Providing data and receiving results was executed manually. Another
auction was performed in [36] among different airlines for implementing the EU
Emission Trading Scheme. Data input and output are performed using CSV
files. In [8] a comparison of key performance indicators among a group of com-
petitive companies was performed. They provided a Javascript library enabling
data collection via the browser; computation results were made available via
a spreadsheet. Burkhart et at. [11] applied SMC to generate network traffic
statistics and anomaly detection. Similarly, [16] reused the same framework to
perform collaborative outage detection. Both do not address deployment and
data access challenges. Recently, Bonawitz et al. [10] used SMC to collect pri-
vate user data from smartphones in order to train a central machine learning
model. For this specific use case, they provide a solution which is intended to
serve as an automated service collecting the desired data.
All of these solutions fall short for the application in the IoT. In most cases,
data is provided manually by user interaction. Similarly, the SMC setup is cre-
ated ad-hoc for single computations. Correspondingly, computations are invoked
by manual intervention. Also, the architecture does not match: Data providers
and result consumers are the same entities. They cooperate in a peer-to-peer
fashion processing data for themselves instead of providing a service for third
parties.
A notable difference is the last mentioned work. They actually provide an
automated SMC service. However, while optimizing for a certain use case, they
sacrifice the ability to compute arbitrary functions and specialize on secure ag-
gregation. Following [24], our solution is agnostic regarding the specific SMC
implementation as long as it supports an arbitrary number of computing par-
ties.
6 Marcel von Maltitz et al.
3.1 Previous work for SMC in the Internet of Things
In [23] von Maltitz et al. provide a vision how SMC can be applied in smart
environments: The starting point are distributed sensor platforms, understood
as edge devices. They represent an intermediary to low-end sensors; they collect
the data created by the connected sensors, store it locally and have sufficient re-
sources to perform local, small-sized data processing. SMC computations among
these devices allow to derive processed and aggregated information from this lo-
cal data, which is then made available so that services (public displays, actuators,
etc.) can act on them.
As middleware, an SMC gateway is deployed. It realizes the link between
the sensor platforms and the data consuming services but without having access
to or storing the sensor data. Regarding the sensor platforms – called peers –,
it coordinates SMC sessions for data processing. Towards the services – called
clients –, the SMC gateway acts as a middleware which allows querying of data
in the standard client server paradigm while abstracting from application of
SMC.
In [24] von Maltitz et al. focused on the interaction between the peers and the
SMC gateway of the aforementioned vision. This work addressed natural tech-
nical mismatches between the premises of secret sharing based SMC [7,31] and
the characteristics of dynamic environments. The result is a management and
orchestration framework for SMC which enables stable and automated execution
of SMC sessions in dynamic environments.
However, since it only provides the first purpose of the SMC gateway, the
remaining challenges for extending SMC, i.e., enabling data querying and access
control on data processed by SMC, are addressed in this work.
4 Open Problems and Goal Statement
The first goal of this work is to allow clients to query data from a coordinated
SMC group. While doing so, the fact that SMC is used for data processing
should be abstracted away for the requesting clients. For this, we need queries
which describe the results to be obtained in a non-SMC specific manner (R.1).
Protection of original sensor data is achieved by SMC. They never leave the
sensor platforms and are not shared with any third party. However, access control
has to be carried out on the derived results, ensuring that no client obtains more
or other data than intended (R.2).
The second goal is a provide a fully privacy-preserving service based on SMC.
This means in addition to fulfilling unlinkability using SMC, transparency (R.3),
including accountability (R.4), and intervenability (R.5) should be achieved ac-
cording to their definitions in Section 2.3.
5 Approach
We extend the gateway solution of [24]. First, we define a format for queries.
A query is a declarative data structure which stands for a computation the
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gateway offers and clients can ask for. Corresponding authorization grants are
specified that state the permission which queries a client is allowed to post.
Lastly, three types of requests are defined: Metadata requests request the set
of available queries from the gateway. Grant requests are sent from the client
to the gateway in order to obtain an authorization grant, permitting a certain
query. Computation requests are actual requests for data, specifying the data
to be obtained using a query and providing a corresponding grant authorizing
them to obtain this very data.
The subsequent protocols enable the following interaction (cf. Figure 1):
Clients perform a metadata request to the gateway (1), obtaining meta informa-
tion about all available queries via this gateway (2). From this set clients select
desirable queries and ask for permission to issue them by performing a corre-
sponding grant request (3). On success, they obtain the respective authorization
grant (4). Data is demanded by a computation request (5). When the gateway
obtains this type of request, permission is checked using the authorization grant
which is sent along with the request. On success, the affected peers are informed,
enabling them to also check and verify the request using the provided authoriza-
tion grant. Additionally, they can perform arbitrary further privacy checks. If
all peers agree, the SMC session is setup and carried out (6). When the gateway
receives the result (7), it is forwarded to the client (8).
Sensor platforms
Clients
1) metadata request
2) available queries
3) grant request
4) authorization grant
5) computation request
6) secure computation
8) computation result
7) computation result
Computation
Secure Multiparty 
Fig. 1. Interactions between the clients, the SMC gateway and the SMC peers.
5.1 Requests and Authorization
Cryptographic identity for clients Given the previous work of [24] we can al-
ready assume the availability of a public key infrastructure. Clients have to be
equipped with a cryptographic identity, e.g. X.509 certificates, for providing a
secure reference point for communication and authorizations to be bound. In
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order to support transparency later on, the identity is enhanced with metadata
about the clients, especially a short description which states the usage purpose
of data obtained by this client.
Query format For performing a secure computation the following properties of
the computation must be known: 1) The group of peers to participate in the
computation 2) the input data to use and 3) the protocol to execute.
Regarding 1) we refrain from letting clients specifically select single peers
to form a group. In our use case, the knowledge which is of interest for clients
is on a higher abstraction level like a department, a floor, a specific room type
etc. Hence, this abstraction is made on the side of the gateway: Newly added
peers provide metadata about themselves, including labels describing peers in
a domain-specific way. We hence define labels(p) to be the set of key-value
pairs (k, v) of peer p. As an example, a peer can have the label set {roomtype:
kitchen, level:3, buildingpart:A,...}.
When a set Pg of multiple peers is connected to a gateway g, it can build the
superset LPg ≡
⋃
p∈Pg labels(p) of all provided attributes. This information can
then be used to create predefined logical predicates forming groups, which can
then be queried by clients. A predicate ‘‘roomtype = kitchen’’ would hence
select all peers which communicated this label upon pairing with the gateway.
Clients can then choose from the finite set of predicates for each of their requests.
In order to guarantees privacy towards the peers, clients should not be allowed to
craft queries themselves instead of selecting from a predefined set: Making more
general queries than provided could enable them to gain information about peers
which they are not allowed to obtain. Making them more specific could allow
derivation of input data of single or a small group of peers.
Similar to the labels, for 2) each peer provides metadata about the inputs
it can provide. We denote this as inputs(p) for peer p. It corresponds with the
sensors the peer has available. Besides the type of input data, clients are given
the ability to select not only the latest data point but also a list of the points
of a given time window reaching into the past. I.e. as preselector the gateway
allows to choose from window sizes like last value, last hour, last 6 hours, . . .
When selecting a window of values, they have to be merged into a single
value as input for the SMC session. For this, we define a preprocessor function
that can be selected by the client and request a corresponding aggregation of
the values before performing the actual computation. These encompass typical
aggregation functions like min,max, sum, average, . . . but can also arbitrarily
extended.
Regarding 3) we depend on the protocols being available on the peers. These
can be provided as labels and clients can again select from a finite set of options.
In summary, the three requirements for SMC sessions are transformed into
five attributes a request has to provide. An example is given in Listing 1.1.
Request translation then conceptually consists of two steps: 1) The selected
group label is evaluated and the corresponding peers are chosen. All further
request attributes are evaluated at the peers, selecting the right (preprocessed)
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input and the protocol to execute. The session is then carried out according to
[24].
1 {
predicate: type = heater ∧
3 roomtype ∈ [kitchen, meetingroom]
preselector: last 6 hours
5 preprocessor: avg
protocol: sum
7 input: power_consumption
}
Listing 1.1. Computation request query
Authorization grants In a dynamic environment, it is imaginable that multiple
gateways are deployed for different purposes. These gateways should be able to
verify access requests without time or communication overhead. I.e. no contact
to other entities should be necessary nor should extensive state on the gateway
itself be necessary for verification. Due to these reasons, we decide for a serial-
ized representation of permission which is transferable and verifiable with a low
amount of state information. The purpose of such an authorization grant is to
state whether a given request is legitimate or not. The client can obtain these
grants from an access authority (e.g. the gateway or an external entity). These
grants encode the requests allowed for this client. Upon request, the clients also
send the grant along in order to prove legitimacy of the request. Forwarding the
grant to the peers enables individual revalidation by the data sources themselves.
Technically, the grant mirrors the attributes of the request. I.e., it also con-
tains a predicate which can be matched against the request predicate. Further-
more, preselector, preprocessor and the input type must be of permitted value.
Besides that, it is bound to the identity of the corresponding client by adding a
cryptographic identifier bound to the client’s certificate. To avoid complications
regarding revocation, we suggest a short lifetime of the grants and renewal on
demand.
Request formats There are two request types: The purpose of the grant request
from the client is to obtain an authorization grant stating access permission. A
request rc,grant of client c consists of the following components (cf. Figure 2): The
certificate states the identity of the client. Queries contains all queries the clients
demands access to. Each contains the attributes as shown in Figure 2. sigclient
serves authentication and integrity-protection of the request. The purpose of the
second request, the computation request, is to actually obtain computed data.
A request rc,comp of client c consists of the following components (cf. Figure 3):
The query contains the predicate and the other characterizing attributes (cf.
Section 5.1). The certificate is as described in the previous request type. The
grant is the authorization grant which states permission to obtain the data in
question. It is the answer of the gateway answer to the previous request type. The
holder is the owner identifier of the grant. not before and not after specify the
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grant request
certificate
fpr
. . .
queries
query
predicate
preselector
preprocessing
protocol
input
. . . query
sigclient
Fig. 2. Structure of a grant request
computation request
query
predicate
preselector
preprocessing
protocol
input
certificate
fpr
. . .
grant
queries
query
...
query
holder
purpose
not before
not after
sigissuer
timestamp
sigclient
Fig. 3. Structure of a computation request
time frame of validity. The queries of the grant mirror the queries to be allowed
for the holder. Timestamp reflects the time when the computation request has
been created. sigissuer states the permission given by the issuing entity.
Accountability of requests Based on the transparency of computation requests
which are forwarded to peers, accountability is achieved by persisting the request
data structure. This is extended by a signature of the accepting gateway and
optionally the result of the computation.
5.2 Protocols
We dissect the client/gateway interaction into three independent protocols: 1) Meta-
data request, 2) grant request, 3) computation request.
Here, we model the state of the gateway to be (Q, Φ) where Q is the finite
set of queries made available by the gateway. Each query has the structure
as shown in Figure 3. Φ : (query, client, context) → {true, false} is an access
control structure; it takes a tuple of a query, a requesting client and a context
and returns whether or not access is permitted.
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Metadata request This is the first interaction between the client and the gateway
that requests meta information about the data being available via the gateway.
The gateway answers with a list of all q ∈ Q.
Grant request Afterwards, clients can demand access to certain information by
requesting a corresponding grant (cf. Figure 4): They send a grant request
rc,grant to the gateway where the checks described below are performed. If
they are successful, the gateway creates and signs a corresponding authoriza-
tion grant. This is sent back to the client.
Verification Given a request rc,grant of client c, the validity of the client cer-
tificate (Equation 1) is checked and whether the requesting client possesses the
corresponding private key.1 Similarly, validity of the request signature (Equa-
tion 2) is verified. Then the semantics of the queries are checked (Equation 3)
using Φ. The parameters are set as follows: The query reflects the demanded
data in a form as described above. The client is represented by its certificate.
The context is the current state of the gateway, this encompasses the information
about currently connected peers and environment information like the current
time.
verify(rc,grant.cert) (1)
verify(rc,grant.sigclient , rc,grant.cert) (2)
∀q ∈ rc,grant.queries : Φ(q, rc,grant.cert , context) (3)
Computation request Requests of this type are performed repeatedly during
productive use in order to obtain aggregated data from the peers. The protocol
is shown in Figure 5. The client sends a computation request (cf. Figure 3) to the
gateway. If the checks as described below are successful, the request is accepted
and transformed into an SMC session. The result of the SMC session is the
requested information. It is signed by the peers and, since the certificate of the
client is available to the peers, encrypted for the client. The encrypted result can
then be forwarded by the gateway to the requesting client.
Verification The gateway and the peers play different roles regarding access
control and intervenability; hence they validate different aspects of the request.
Given a request rc,comp of client c, the gateway first checks whether the holder
matches the requesting client and the client certificate is valid (Equation 4), it
checks the authenticity of the request (Equation 5), then it verifies whether the
authorization grant itself is valid (Equation 6 – 8).
rc,comp .grant .holder = c.cert .fpr ∧ verify(c.cert) (4)
verify(sigclient , c.cert) (5)
rc,comp .grant .not before ≤ now (6)
now ≤ rc,comp .grant .not after (7)
verify(issuer .cert) ∧ verify(sigissuer , issuer .cert) (8)
1 When using TLS, this is already handled during TLS session establishment.
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Client Gateway
Prepare grant request
1 : Send grant request
2 : Check Equation 1 – 3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Check: Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 : Create and sign grant
4 : Grant
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Check: Fail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 : Failure notice
Fig. 4. Grant Request Protocol. In a grant request clients demand an authorization to
execute a specified set of queries. The gateway checks, whether or not the requesting
client is allowed to access the corresponding data. If yes, an authorization grant is
created and handed over to the client.
After checking formal validity, the validity of the request itself is verified, i.e.,
whether the grant supports the stated query. This is realized by checking for the
inclusion of the query in the permitted set (Equation 9).
∃q ∈ rc,comp .grant .queries : q = rc,comp.query (9)
Verification by the peers happens when the session is communicated to them
(Step 5 in Figure 5). Besides rechecking abovementioned checks, each peer p ∈
P can have a set Φp of local policies which defines how their data may be
used and the corresponding privacy constraints. Satisfaction of these policies
can also be checked (Equation 10). This e.g. can include a check for recency of
the computation request in order to prevent replay attacks.
Φp ` (c, rc,comp.query) (10)
6 Discussion
In the previous sections we presented an approach to fulfill the requirements
stated in Section 4. The computation request and the corresponding protocol
allow third parties to query for data computed by SMC (R.1). By doing so,
securely computed information becomes accessible to outside clients. Access on
the computed results can be controlled by authorization grants required for
computation requests (R.2). This enables controlled data flow when serving a
heterogeneous set of deployed services.
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Client Gateway
Prepare computation request
1 : Send computation request
2 : Check Equation 4–9
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Check: Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 : Accept notice
4 : Store and process request
5 : Inform peers
6 : Perform computation
7 :
8 : Obtain result
9 : Result
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Check: Fail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 : Failure notice
Fig. 5. Computation Request Protocol. A client demands for the results of a com-
putation specified in its request. If the request is valid, the client is notified about
acceptance and processing of the request is performed in lines 4 – 6 as described in
[24]. The result, coming back in line 8 is then forwarded to the client in line 9.
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Making the request verification independent from the access control structure
Φ and its context parameter, i.e. not relying on complex state of the gateway
for access control but on transferable documents, allows to use the same data
structures to fulfill desired privacy-protection goals: Peers are informed about
upcoming computations and their context if they are involved, since the for-
warded requests include the query and the corresponding authorization grant of
the requesting client (R.3). An authenticated history of data access and usage
can be built (R.4), since authenticated requests can also be persisted by each
peer. The signatures of the client, the gateway and the peer ensure that integrity
of request and corresponding grant is protected. Giving peers the ability to verify
this request using their own local policies Φp and allowing them to veto against
requested computations enables intervenability (R.5). As a consequence, data
minimization is supported: Data sources can to make sure that there are not
more or different computations performed than they expect to happen.
Regarding possible attacks from Section 2.3, our solution performs as fol-
lows: A.1, A.2, and A.7 have been excluded by design. A gateway cannot forge
computation requests (A.3), since it cannot provide a valid signature for Equa-
tion 5. Replay attacks using former computation requests is prevented by adding
a timestamp to the request. The gateway cannot collect data requested by valid
clients (A.4), since the obtained result (cf. Figure 5, step 8) is encrypted for the
receiving client. Similarly, the result cannot be changed by the gateway (A.5),
since the result is signed by the peers. Prevention of unauthorized access by
clients (A.6) is a fundamental goal of our work and achieved by providing grants
which state the permissions of every individual client. Our protocol introduces
no new leaks for the information computed by SMC. Hence, the security prop-
erties of the utilized SMC realization apply: The state of the art [15,14,20,21] is
already secure against n− 1 maliciously colluding peers. Since the data owners’
device always participates in the computation when using their data, security of
the own raw data is already achieved by guaranteeing that the own device is not
compromized.
7 Evaluation
For evaluation of our approach we implemented a prototype in python and per-
formed measurements of the protocols presented (cf. Figure 4 and 5).
7.1 Setup
Scenario As scenario we consider a single floor in a smart building. This implies
around 10 to 30 peers which are connected to a single gateway. The gateway is
assumed to be decent commodity hardware. The network is an intranet with low
latency, a typical throughput and no packet loss.
Hardware and System We used 4 hosts in our setup. These are equipped with
eight cores at 2.50 GHz and a main memory of 15.780 MB. They have 1 Gbit net-
working interfaces and are arranged in a star topology. The default link latency
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is around 0.18 ms. As operating system we use Debian Stretch (9.4) based on a
4.9.0 Linux kernel.
The roles of the gateway, the client and the peers have to be reflected in the
setup. We deployed the gateway and the client on individual hosts. Furthermore,
a single peer was deployed on a dedicated host; all other peers were started as
processes on a single further machine.
Implementation The prototype is implemented in python as a flask 1.0.2 appli-
cation and executed using python 3.5.3. Data is stored in a mongodb version
3.2.11 and as authorization backend authzforce 8.0.1 [3] is used which is located
on the gateway host. The flask application is served by uwsgi 2.0.17.1. Uwsgi
is executed with a single process and eight threads, if not told otherwise. The
queue for unanswered requests has a limit of 100 entries. When contacting the
peers, the gateway spawns a thread for each peer in order to allow simultaneous
waiting for all responses.
For testing purposes no actual SMC component was connected to our query-
ing framework. This allows to measure the overhead of our components without
depending on the performance characteristics of a chosen SMC implementation.
We decided for this omission, since we assessed the performance of a state of the
art SMC implementation elsewhere [22].
Method We measured the duration of client requests handled by the gateway
(latency). The measured time begins when the request is handed to our custom
code; it ends when the final response is handed back to uwsgi. In the results, we
show the median, the 0.25 and the 0.75 quantile. For each frequency, we captured
the amount of requests the gateway was able to handle successfully per second
(throughput). Lastly we recorded the state of the request queue.
7.2 Results
Grant Request Protocol The grant request protocol is carried out when a client
aims to obtain further access rights to data queries offered by the gateway. This
only happens when new clients are deployed or permissions change over time.
We assume that a small number of requests per second is only exceeded during
peak times.
This amount of requests is well supported. Even under a load of ≥ 100
requests per second, answer time stays below 20 ms (Figure 6). The queue of
the gateway becomes saturated only after 170 requests/s. Correspondingly, the
throughput stagnates at the same point (Figure 7). Since no peer interaction
happens, performance is independent of their number.
Computation Request Protocol The computation request protocol is always car-
ried out when a computation on actual sensor data is queried. With polling
every second per client, and multiple clients being connected, multiple requests
per second can be expected.
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Fig. 6. Grant Request Protocol: The duration of handling a single request inside the
gateway component depending on the amount of requests performed by the client.
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Fig. 7. Grant Request Protocol: The amount of successfully answered requests depend-
ing on the amount of requests performed by the client. Up to a load of 170 requests/s,
throughput increases proportionally and no drops occur. Afterwards, the queue is filled
and throughput stagnates on this level.
With 30 peers connected, a single request per second yields a latency of
~250ms. With increasing load this converges to ~1.7 seconds per request (Fig-
ure 8). Varying the number of peers show that each added peer approximately
contributes further 50 ms to the overall latency. The reason is computational
overhead per connection – mainly signing outgoing messages and verifying the
signatures of incoming messages – which cannot be handled in parallel due to
the global interpreter lock in python. We can propose several mitigations for this
overhead: 1) Firstly, we assume a non-prototypical implementation in a language
which optimizes more for speed will provide a lower overhead. Especially using a
language which provides real parallelization and/or more efficient implementa-
tions of the corresponding actions should decrease this overhead. 2) Caching can
be considered: Peers’ agreement to computations could be extended by an in-
terval of validity, implicitly allowing later consecutive identical requests without
Data Querying and Access Control for Secure Multiparty Computation 17
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.5
1
1.5
Load [req/sec]
L
a
te
n
cy
[s
]
10 peers
20 peers
30 peers
Fig. 8. Computation Request Protocol: The duration of handling a single request inside
the gateway component depending on the amount of requests performed by the client.
This includes forwarding the request to all concerned peers and waiting for their request
acceptance. Waiting for the responses of the peers constitutes the biggest part of the
overall duration.
further overhead. 3) Our architecture can be applied hierarchically. allowing sev-
eral gateways per area which segment peers into semantically sensible groups,
being large enough to ensure unlinkability. Recursively, gateways can in turn
function as higher-level peers for further aggregation.
Concomitant with the increase in latency, the request queue is exhausted
early between 5 – 20 requests/s and a high throughput is inhibited (Figure 9).
Here, the bottleneck is the CPU of the gateway. Providing 4 uwsgi processes
shows that parallelization doubles the throughput.
8 Summary
In the Internet of Things and smart environments, services need data about the
environment and its inhabitants for action. However, this data is personal data
and, hence, privacy critical.
The state of the art handles this data by deploying a middleware for storage
and processing. The results are then forwarded to services and applications. How-
ever, this centralization enables several privacy threats. Hence, a more privacy-
preserving method of data processing should be considered.
A promising approach is Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC). Data can
remain on individual distributed sensor platforms. Afterwards, desired results
can be derived on-the-fly by secure computation without intermediate storage.
We provide a method to execute queries on privacy-sensitive sensor data by
extending SMC: Our approach allows third party clients to request data pro-
cessing from SMC without taking part in the computations themselves. Further-
more, we add further elements which are needed for obtaining a fully privacy-
preserving service: Protection of results is achieved by access control on the level
of individual queries. Requests and processing becomes fully transparent for the
cooperating sensor platforms. This supports intervenability, i.e., enabling them
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Fig. 9. Computation Request Protocol: The amount of successfully answered requests
depending on the amount of requests performed by the client. Latency of single requests
restricts the amount of successful requests, since the request queue is already filled
between 5 – 10 requests/s.
to stay in control of their data and and allowing them to reject processing if
their privacy requirements for incoming data requests are not fulfilled.
Future Work In combination with [24], we realized the full architecture of a
privacy-preserving service for smart environments. However, several further chal-
lenges are open. 1) Abstractly, we enabled checking of requests by peers given
local policies Φp. The design of these semantic checks could be further investi-
gated. 2) Clients are only allowed to select predefined predicates due to privacy
reasons. If arbitrary predicates could be checked against privacy rules, clients
could be allowed to define predicates themselves. 3) The gateway could create
its access control structure Φ by collecting and merging the distributed set of
Φp, directly guaranteeing compatibility between them.
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